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Abstract. Dynamic database behaviour can be specified by dynamic integrity constraints, w~i~~~ 
determine admissihk sequences of database states, and by transaction specifications, which induce 
executable sequences. Constraints are ex, -Fessed by formulae of temporal Logic:, whereas transac- 
tions are defined by pre/postconditions in predicate logic. This article presents ~~~~epts 
for transforming dynamic constraints into transaction specifications in order to prepare 
monitoring by transactions. At first, such transition graphs must be constructed from 
formulae that have paths corresponding to admissible sequences. Then these 
to refine and to simplify pre/postconditions systematically so that every executable state sequence 
will become admissible, too. 
ntroduction 
An essential aspect of database design is specification of dynamic database 
behaviour [I]. To this end, dynamic integrity constraints, which define correctness 
of state sequences, are stated as well as transaction specifications, which define 
basic state changes. These two kinds of information will usually complement each 
other at an cz1y stage of design. Together they restrict possible sequences ofdatabase 
states to sequences wF?ich are “admissible” and “executable”: such sequences obey 
the constraints and are induced by the transactions. 
In order to ensure correct database behaviour, integrity constraints must be 
monitored exp’icitly or preserved by transactions implicitly. The first method nee 
a universal runtime monitor, which normally is expensive because of application 
independence and which has been avoided by most of today’s D S even for static 
constraints. The second method relies on specifying all (basic) database accesses 
of application programs at design time: it requires to verify transactions w 
to constsaints, i.e., to prove that every executable state sequence is also 
To obtain such desirable transaction specifications systematical1 
straints should be incorporated by means of suitable t~ansfo 
verification often beco es unnecessary. ation of static constraints 
complete checks of all c 
f every transaction; t 
monitor. Considering constraints 
ecks to objects and co 
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simplifications 
s possible during t hase to obtain co 
se fundamenta! 
2~ integrity constrain 
of transitional ~nte~~~t~ 
addressed in t cr;ature, most of the a s have favoured spec 
ic f23,3,4, 12, 16,7/ Such a formalism allows us to 
tate sequences, ince e togic is extended by te 
rcaetime. . . before. . .’ 
explicit quantifying ov 
Or subsequences i avoided. Concerning transactions, pre/postconditions are a 
arison wit er formalisms see, 
iven transactio 
d by several of the mentioned 
oofs and (automatic) proof-theoretic 
straints can be fou 
applied to static co 
about transacti 
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or multipte relatio dates, whereas our approach includes arbitra 
resent state means. 
straints will rest on two key 
dmissibility of a state sequence 
en as the goal of monitoring. Second, 
poral formulae in order to 
to (~a~jalJy) admissible state s 
bese transition 
odes are the only 
ent theoretic foundations of monitorin 
ere, we aim ai transfo 
so that each executa 
rmation results syste 
is paper is structured as follows. The next two sections briefly introduce syntax 
raints and of transaction specificatio 
Se;:Ion 4 summarizes results needed for the transitional interpretation of temporal 
en Section 5 presents and verifies the transformation rules. This work 
Static constraints, which are to describe properties of database states, can usually 
ressed by formulae of first order predicate logic. As a prerequisite, the 
al elements of states (e.g., relations, tuples, and attributes) must have been 
ted by nonlogical predicate or function symbols a d by some axioms, the 
so-called inhersnt constraints. To be independent from s ecific data models, we 
assume that such a functional description of objects and information a 
is given. Thus the syntactic structure of states is defined by a signature as follows. 
Let a fixed set of data types like Boot, lnt, ext, and Yti~r be given, 
each introducing a new ata sort and corresponding data operators. AR o6ject 
signature OB.? = (So, Fo) consists of a set So of elements calle 
set FO of function symbols. Each function symbol f has an a 
with object or data sorts s, (i = 0, . . . , m ). redicates are 
functions. 
e nas ture for an “a obile reg~stratjon a~tb~r~ty’* 
t in [13] the owing object sorts and functions a 
R b, CAR-OWNE 
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serialno: 
manuf[acturer]: 
registered : 
model: 
owner: 
naR99: 
[is-lapproved: 
is-MANUF[ACTURER 
is-GARAGE, is-PERSON: 
this-year: 
CAR + Int 
CAR + CAR-OW 
CAR + Boo1 
CAR + Int 
CAR-O 
+ Year 
ER + Bool 
/*Qpes of car-o 
(partition)*/ 
/*current year*/ 
First order formuhe are built from terms over data operators, o 
symbols, and variables by using equations, logical connectives ( A, v , 1, . . .), and 
quantifiers (V, 3) over objet or data sorts. They are interpreted in states c where 
each object sort s is mapped o a finite set u(s) of actual objects and each function 
symbol f is mapped to an actual function a( f ) involving the specified sets of objects 
or data. For each object sort s, we assume to have a common superset (s) of 
possible objects, the so-called ‘&universe of discourse”. It may be constructed algebrai- 
cally from “key functions” like serialno and certain constraints [6]. TIx interpreta- 
tion of data types is fixed for the universe and for all states with respect $0 the 
cbject signature OBJ. 
In order to specify properties of state sequences, we make use of a temporal logic 
which extends predicate logic by special operators relating states within sequences; 
thus no explicit sort “state” is needed. 
~~~~~~ 2.3. Temporal formulae are built from nontemporal formulae, i.e. first- 
r formulae, by applying iteratively logical connectives znd 
quantifiers over actual objects (V, 3) and CRY possible objects (y, 3) 
temporal quantifiers ahvays . . . 
bounded temporal quantifiers a 
and temporal succession operators next.. . and onnext. . . . 
Other derived operators may be usd for convenience. Specification and tra 
tion of dynamic integrity constraints will be restricted to (extended) prapositional- 
temporal logic. 
A propositional-temporal formula 50 is a temporal formula built from 
r1.t using object quantifiers. The induced set 
s exactly all the nontemporal constitue 
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are interpreted in infinite or finite state seqsrences g - 
CF~_,), n 3 0, for substitutions 6 of their free variables 
mula (9 is valid in c+ for 0, we write “[g, @I/== cp”. 
is used for conventional validity of a no 
state CF. “9 k= @’ means that cp is valid in p for arbitrary 
case, q is called admissible with respect 3 cp. 
In the next paragraph, vaiidity is defined by induction on formula strut 
definition starts fro atomic formulae which are boolean terms or equations t = t’ 
between terms. 
Let cy, cc/, T be temporal formulae, p an atomic formu!a, g a state 
ce, and 0 a substitution. I(g) denotes the index range of g, i.e. 
W% Cl 9 . . .))=N and I(&,, . . . , o,_~)) ={O,. . . , n - 1); gi, in I(a), denotes the 
ith tail sequence (aj lj > i A j E I( CT)), and the index pt7 stands for the first occurrence 
of 7, i.e. 
(0) 
(1) 
(2) 
W 
(3b) 
(44 
(5) 
&LT=min((jE I(~)l[~j,6]kT~W(O"}). 
[TV, O] I= p iff all free variables in p are replaced by actual objects of cr, and 
[00, 61 c= p. 
Logical connectives A, v , -I, . . . are interpreted as usual. 
The quantifiers V/3 refer to actual objects of ao, v/3 to possible objects (
for all i E I(g): [ 
iff there exists I (g) such that [gi, 0]ktc/. 
for 41 i E I( 0): i < PT implies [gi, 01 t= + if Ju7-<00, 
for all iE J(g): [gi, 0jk$, i.e., [CJ 0]kal otherwise. 
there exists i E I( a) such that i c PT and [ gi, lb $ if PT<% 
l-s w= acI 
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Thus, nontemporal formulae are evaluated in the first state a0 of a given state 
sequence a. The temporal quantifiers al 
formula # to be valid in every o 
requirement can 
which start befo 
or including it). Th 
aI. If $ is a nonte 
of tail sequences gi- 
Two further quan ifiers facilitate references to the first and to every re 
occurrence of a “start” condition CL 
ition 2.7 
O]I=# if pucu<K+ 
otherwise. 
acts 2.8 
By analogy to duality ofobject quantiJiers V/3 the above pairs of tempera 
are dual to each other: 
coincide or infinite sequences. 
al connectwe:, ne and om arbitrary 
S . . . 
st@ce to derive all other operators. In particular, the from operator can be expressed 
by: 
Q! al ys (icy v $1 until ct. 
For proofs and further aws see, e.g., [ 15,221. 
When specifying dynamic integrity, we assume that the complete behaviour of a 
database is characterized by an infinite sequence consisting of an initial state,, the 
e present state, and a possible future. Thus constraints are meant as 
restrictions on infinite sequences. According to the definition tif admissibility, the 
formulae have to be interpreted in these sequences under all substitutions with 
arbitrary possible objects. 
obile 
this-year > y + I ) 
/* When a car c has been entered into the databare, it is not yet register 
be registered sometime in the same or in the next year (with its maru 
er), whereupon it always remai s registered (possibly with &an owners). */ 
owner(c) Z manuf(c) 
(owner(c) =co A is-GARAG 
owner(c) = co ore is-PERSON (owner(c))) 
/* From the moment when a car c is no longer owned by its manufacturer, it may 
never be passed to any manufacturer again. Whenever it belongs to a garage co, it 
mz.:t remain in this property before it is sold to a person. */ 
With the exception of n xt and onnext, the temporal operators guarantee the 
useful property that monitoring can be restricted to true state changes only. 
Two state sequences c and a’ are called iteration-equivalent iff they 
e number of local iterations of each state (between one and infinitely 
many at the end of a sequence). Formally, there must exist a monotonously increasing 
mapping c: I(c,) -+ I(&) between the index ranges such that L(O) = 0 and for each 
i E I(g) holds: 
tit c”I(i) and c:(i, = (T: 
for e\~ery;cl(~‘), ~(i)dj and j<t(i+l), if i+kl(o). 
A temporal formula 9 is called iteration-invariant iff [CF, 8 J I= <p implies [g’, 8 J t= cp 
for every pair (g, a’) of iteration-equivalent state sequences and every substitution 
8. 
temporal operators only,frorn ( 
is iteration-invariant. 
s the only critical roof by induction on rmula structure, we 
equivalent. Let q, p’, ‘) be given as in 
f the argument formulae ~4, r hold i 
in C$ with b(i) ~j < L( i+ I), since these tail seq ces are iteratio 
particular, we obtain 
cases of the lemma ca~a b 
Transactions are specific 
preconditions atisfied before executio 
A transaction specification is desoted by 
consists of a ylam4 r, a set eter variables, a set L of local varia 
c cases of prelpostconditions vj/ pi3 1 s j 
written as { 7~) t( P) (pi}) and a set i?l of frame conditions. All conditions are 
h free variables from P and L. A substitution Or of the parameter 
ssible objects) is called actual parameter, and a su 
s by data or actual objects from a given state is called local 
te for a parameter p iff there exists a local s 
tramfirs a state cr into a state C’ for a parameter 
1s applicabPe in (T 
and the following holds for all local substitutions QL in CT, all cases 9 (1 s j 6 c), 
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us, a relation “‘transfers” is defined between states. 
s to construct a poststate 0’ from a given stat 
the applicability co 
e deter-mined not uniquely. 
ves room for refi 
and realization 
licit within the applicability con 
sequences as follows. 
y transaction specifications to “executable” 
. Let 9 be a set of transaction specifications. finite or infinite state 
sequence q is called executable with respect to 9 iff, for each state t 
(a,-, 9 4 fi Fi._ I # ai, a transaction t E 9 and a parameter Or exist WC 
I;rt t transfers 0i-r to q for &. 
To maintain executability, errors of transaction application may simply be han 
by not changin the current state (a,- i = Ci). Other useful reactions Iike warnmgs 
r even er*or recovery are not relevant to our discussion. 
Definitions 3.2 and 3.1 can directly be re-formulated in temporal ogic using the 
s (once) and onne only. We will refer to this sublogic as transi- 
tional logic. 
et Pt, cy,, etc. be the various components of a transaction t. xpressions 
etc. involving a set X of variables x, , . . , x,,, are abbreviations of 
“f (x,, . . . , x,)?’ , etc. Then a state sequence q is executab 
s(EvJpR(W,a.) 
Lt A (rrt,i * P*,j) A A ts* 
j=l.....C fir9 
where 
-==-- 
G= A 
.f object 
function 
in QBJ 
The formula E specifies that two succ 
v~~~ab~es for a ts / I%?3 
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Typical transactioils in our example database are registration and sale 
of a car as well as updating the current year. 
u1) next-year: 
x: Year, c”: CAR, co”, m 
OCS true 
e this-year=x ost this-year =x + 1 
anuf(c”) = mf”, r “,ered Ic”), ypegistered(c”), 
owner( c”) = co”, etc. 
(equally for all other object functions except this-year) 
/* The current year is incremented by 1. */ 
(T2) sell(c: CAR, newco: CAR-OWNER): 
vars c”: CAR, mf”, co”: CAR-OWNER, y”: Year, etc. 
Oll owner(c) Z newco 
true ost owner(c) = newco 
freme c” f c =3 owner(c”) = co”; 
manuf(c”) ==mf”, registered( Iregistered( 
this-year =y”, etc. 
/* A car c is transferred to a new owner newco. */ 
(T3) register (c: CAR, m: MODEL, co: CAR-OWNER,. . .): 
V%lS G”: CAR, r”: ht, mf”: CAR-OM( ER, y”:Year, etc. 
031 Tregistered(c) A approved( md) 
re true 
ost registered(c) A 4~‘: CAR (c’ # c A regno(c’) =regno(c) 
A model(c) = m A owner(c) =co A . . . 
me registered( c” # c + Tregistered(c”), 
c” # c * regno(c”) = r”, etc. 
/* A car c may be registered if the model m has been approved. Then a unique 
registraticn number is assigned and the parameter information is stored. *g/ 
So far, the transactions need not necessarily respect the integrity constraints of 
xample 2.9. Thus the specifications of admissible and executable state sequences 
really complement each other. 
Later transformations of pre/ ostconditions, in particular simplifications, will 
utilize formulae whose validity is preserved under a transaction. 
A formula S is called invariant under a transaciion 9 i 
llowing’condition for all states a, U’ and parameters QP SL& &at f transfers 
CT into a’, and for all local substitutions OL: 
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les above might suggest hat frame conditions can easi 
from postconditions. At least, all functions not mentioned should be invariant, and 
so all formulae involvi these functions only. Complications arise if, e.g., condi- 
tional or disjunctive ulae are used as postconditions; then those “synt.actic” 
frame conditions ight not exclude all undesirable state changes. A maximal de 
of invariance can e achieved by the following “semantic” frame rule: 
o is minimally changed to o’, i.e. no change of any object fun 
CT to 0’ can be undone without violating condition 
A similar principle has already been proposed in [32], but the majority of 
stick to purely syntac ic assumptions. To be more flexible, we have li 
conditions explicitly. 
ransitional inter ynamie integri 
‘efore we can transform dynamic integrity constraints into transaction 
specifications, we have to tackle two basic problems of monitoring. Constraints are 
temporal formulae -which normally are interpreted in infinite state sequences. Thus 
their validity may depend upon (1) unknown future states and (2) entire subsequen- 
ces. Concerning (l), we introduce notions of partial validity up to the present state 
in order to obtain a realistic goal of monitoring. Concerning (2), we make use of 
hs that can be constructed from temporal formulae and that reduce 
analysis of state sequences to state transitions. 
4.1. Partial validity 
During. runtime, only a nite prefix of database behaviour is known: the sequence 
from an nitial state up to he present state. Future continuations, however, depend 
on the us~r’s choice of state transitions. Thus integrity monitoring should be able 
ctness at each moment from a finite sequence only. For this purpose, 
the following degrees of partial validity seem to be reasonable. 
Let a finite state sequence q = (a,, q , . . . , a,, _ 1)4 n 2 0, a substitution 
8 and a temporal formula cy be given. 
(a) 50 is strictly valid in Q- (for 0) iff it is valid according to Definition 2.6 
(IIS 01 I= cp). 
(b) cp is stationarily valid in a (for 6) iff it is valid in t 
sequence ((r” (on+, un+, . . .)). 
(c) q is potentially valid in p (for 0) i these exists so 
cy=((T:,u=;,...) such that [(T 0 Q-‘, O] i= cp. 
(d) g is provisionally valid in q iff it is valid in (g 0 A ) according to 
2.6, where & is a hy etical sequence assume to satisfy arbitrary fm 
I Please note that this is only an observational characterization of a rmre technical definition rrot 
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0 is called strictly, stationnrily, etc. admissible with respect to p iff 50 is valid in the 
respective sense for every substitution. 
The notions are obviously related. 
.2. Notions (a) and (b) are equivalent for an iteration-invariant_formula rp. 
For arbitrary formu e, the implication (b)+(c)*(d) holds. 
Strict and stationary admissibility (a/b) say that database manipulation can be 
finished after the present state without invalidating the constraint. In many situations, 
only the weaker requirement of potential admissibility (c) can be satisfied, since 
future manipulations are expected to handle pending conditions like 
arguments. Thus this notion seems to be most desirable as the goal of 
it guarantees at least one correct continuation. Provisional admissibility (d), however, 
is sufficient, if one optimistically assumes that every condition can become valid at 
some future time. This notion excludes exactly all definitive constraint violations 
that have occurred up to the present state, e.g. by exceeding a termination condition; 
inevitable future errors are not detected. 
4.2. Transition graphs 
Let a propositional-temporal formula 50 with basic (nontemporal) 
cp (cf. Definition 2.3) be given. A transition graph T = ( V, E, ZJ, q, v,) for 
Q consists of 
a directed graph ( E) with a finite set V of nodes and edges E c V x V, 
a node labelling u y propositional-temporal formulae over BF,, 
s m edge iabelhng T by propositional formulae over BF, (i.e. nontemporal logical 
combinations of basic formulae), 
and a root node VIE V with u( vo) = Q. 
Moreover, any edge label must not be equivalent to false by only applying laws of 
propositional calculus and treating basic formulae as atomic parts. 
Transition graphs sha:!li be used to analyse a state sequence by searching for a 
corresponding path, whose edge labels successively hold in the states of the sequence. 
Such computations require to “mark” the nodes that have been reached at each 
moment. 
Let q = (co, . . . , a,_,) be a fir&c state sequence with ;e 
and let Q be a substitution of the free variables occurring in Q. The marking 
of a transition graph T is inductively defined as the following sets of nodes: 
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The definition of tr is called transition rule and formalizes stepwise processing 
of the graph. A node v’ is marked after passing a state CT iff there exists an edge e 
from a marked node v to v’, and the label q(e) is valid in CT. If no edge starting 
from the old mar applies, tr yields the empty set, so that the inspected state 
sequence is no lo 
finite state sequence Q is accepted by T iff the marking 
nempty for every substitution 0. 
g is accepted by T iff a path exists in Tfor each substitutiovo 8 which has 
the same length as g, which starts at vO, and where [a,_1 , 01 k qi holds for each ith 
node label vi. 
Since the transition graph is to be used for monitoring the temporal formula 4p, 
it has to obey a semantic restriction on its labels. 
A transition graph T (as above) is correct iff the following equivalence 
holds in infinite state sequences for each node v with outgoing edges ek = (v, vk ), 
k=l,... , d (Fig. 1). 
d 
dv)e v 
k=l 
dvk)) 
This condition can be characterized semantically. 
T is correct iff the following conditions are equivalent at each node 3: 
(i) [P, tW= V(V). 
(ii) there ‘s k such that [co, O]F q(ek) and [c,, e]t= v(vk), 
(iii) [CT, 9O]I= V( vk ). (An empty disjunction means .) 
k=l 
CUG, @I+ v(q) 
Fig. 1. 
A (temporal) node label is valid in a state sequ 
iB at least one outg 
label of the corresp 
in a correct tra aph must be constraint parts or 
re. 
m 
821 
hs have been co 
was used. Our more abstract an 
w.r. t. q cj= accepted 
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Particularly useful for monitoring and transformation are special transition graphs: 
In “deterministic” graphs (ilke those in Examples ), at most one outgoin 
edge applies in each state, so that markings consist 
In “iteration-invariant” graphs, markings do not change on a state ite 
These properties are defined by following conditions on edge labels. 
it io 3. A transition graph is called deterministic ff for each no 
outgoing edges ek = (v, ok ), k = 1, . . . , d haIds: 
forall k,k’e{l,...,d},k#k’ 
i.e., labels of di rent outgoing edges exclude each other. 
A transition graph is called iterution-invurimt iff there exists a loop 
e’ = (v’, v’) for each edge e = (v, v”) such t at q(e)*q(e’); cf. Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3. 
XL 7he algorithm in [21] constructs deterministic and iteration-invariant graphs 
from iteration-invariant formulae as in Lemma 2.10. 
Figures 4 and 5 show such transition graphs for the integrity con- 
straints of Example 2.9 that are correct, reduced, deterministic, and iteration- 
invariant. The following abbreviations are used: 
(Cl) q*= iregistered A (this-year = ~39,~) A pj2 
re this-year > y + 1 
;Jhere y(c, co) stands for (owner(c) =co A is-GARAGE(co)). 
we-VW- __QO_____ __- 
eys owner(c) =co 
Fig. 4. Tmnsition graph T, for pi. 
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=ds- 
c3> A 
Fig. 5. Transition graph T2 for cp2. 
It can easily be recognized that both graphs describe life-cycles of database objects 
(or object combinations) with respect to the integrity constraints. Intuitively, the 
n~!es correspond to following situations: 
1: (1) A car c before insertion 
(2) 4 car c between insertion in year y and timely registration 
(3) k car c after registration 
W 2 year y other than the year of insertion (irrelevant) 
Tz: (1) L car c owned by its manufacturer 
(2) G car c owned by a garage co 
(3) k car c owned by a person or by a garage # co 
Missing edges indicate possibilities of constraint violation: T, forbids late registra- 
tions since no edge starts from node (2) in the case this-year > y + 1, and T1 excludes 
zc manufacturers since no edge leads from nodes (2)/(3) to node (1). 
Now we know how monitoring integrity constraints in state sequences can be 
reduced to passing through transition graphs with special properties. These graphs 
determine th : degree of admissibility to be guaranteed at runtime: it lies 
provisional and potential admissibility. 
Our original task of transformi integrity constraints into transaction 
specifications has been redefined by th 
ead of constraints and to make 
ite set F of transaction specific 
g correct transitio 
ify presentation and to allow 
assumptions. 
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. (i) The transition graphs are deterministic and iteration-invariant; 
be achieved by appropriate graph constructions for iteration-invariant 
constraints. 
(ii) Markings need to be considered for actual (existing) objects only. s 
for so-called “existence-restricted” constraints like those above 
(iii) Transactions do not insert or delete objects, so that the 
remain constant du ing a state sequence. Only this assumption i 
tion relevant o practice, The calculus beiow, however, can be extended to insertions 
and deletions [ 191. 
The following transformation steps have to be applied to all transaction 
specifications for each constraint 50 E (e. The first two steps describe mo 
which do not consid transactions individually. Then the third step will show how 
specific knowledge out transactions can be utilized to simplify transformation 
results. 
5. I. Extension 
Since transactions hall decide about the acceptance of state sequences by the 
given transition graph (T,), the database must be extended by a representation of 
node markings. 
ation 5.2 (Step I: Signature extension). Let X be the set of free valid 
x1,***,&?1 in cp with associated sorts sl, . . . , s,. Then extend the given object 
signature OBJ (Definition 2.1) to a signature OBJ’ by adding a (data) sort Node 
denoting the set of nodes in TW and an object function symbol 
marking: s1 x l l l x s, + Node. 
This function has to be manipulated by transactions uch that it represents t’he 
marking &, 0) which is reached after passing a sequence prefix q, if a certain 
substitution 8 of the variables X is given. Since Assumptions U(i)/ (ii) allo& :o 
consider actual substitutions and singleton markings only, markings are indeed 
functionally determined by 0 and 8. 
The extension step introduces the (minimal) information into data 
and states that is necessary to monitor the dynamic constraint; no previous state 
has to be analysed. The additional information is needed for further transformation, 
ut it may be helpful also to a user at runtime, since it indicates which situation 
has been reached in the life-cycle of an object and which conditions (node labels) 
remain to be satisfied. 
. Formally, the graph T, of Example 4.16 induces a function 
Closer analysis of gra eessi cient to 
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since only one year, the year of insertion, has to be remembered for each car, and 
that only in connection with node (2). To improve readability the name “markin& 
might be replaced oriented name Ii e “registration-status”. 
The main transformation task is to incorporate the computation of gra 
the pre/postconditions of transactions. Up to now we have only 
rmulae by the nonlogical symbol “mar-kin 
express acceptance like executability (Lemma 3.3) in tr 
finite state sequence a w.v.t. the object signature QBJ is accepted 6y 
the deterministic transition graph TV = ( V, E, v, q, vO) iff there is a state sequence cf 
w.r.t. OBJ+ which has a as its OBJ-reduct (i.e. it coincides with 0 on OBJ sorts arrd 
functions), and which satisjes the following condition : 
&C= WX a9, A always VX A (markirlg(X) = v =+ onnext @,J 
Cf v 
A (T(e) --J, marking(X) = v’) 
eE E 
e=( L‘, 0’) 
Arabian. In every next state, the label q(e) of some edge e starting in a marked 
node v must hold, and the new marking v’ results according to that valid edge. A 
corresponding condition applies to the initial state with respect o the root node vo. 
roof. The given condition formalizes the acceptance of q by TV and the transition 
rule (Definitions 4.4,4.5), since it requires o+ to satisfy for each substitution 6 and 
each n E I(: r): 
bz, @]I= (marking(X) = v) iff A&-@-,, . . . , a,), 0) = {v}. 
Thus, existence of such a sequence a+ equivalently characterizes acceptance of g. Cl 
Now, a comparison of Lemmas 3.3 and 5.4 sugg,ests t ent of 
ej%ement). It is r 
Besides, the implic 
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Then transform each case (vj} P(P) {pi} (j ;= 1, . . . ,c) of each transaction 
specification TV Y in as many casps as the graph TV has nodes: 
rkin$j(X) = V}t’( P j{ pi A GL,} 1 V E V) 
The formula QV has been given in Lemma 5.4. So the set of local variables is 
extended by X, w reas applicability and frame conditions are not ch UI 
9’ denote the set resulting transaction specifications. 
The next theorem verifies that this transformation guarantees acceptance oi 
executable state sequences, provided the sequences have been initialized correctly. 
Theorem 5.6. For e&t finite state sequence q w.r. t. OBJ’ Mds: 
g is executable w.r. t 3’ and q,l= QX@,, 3 q is accepted by TV 
Proof. Let t’ denote the refinement of a transaction specification t, and let P,, LY,, 
P,-, (Y,~, etc. be the components. Applying Lemma 3.3 (executability) to the refined 
specifications Y’ yields 
where 
P,* = P*, L,’ = L, + X 3 Wt’, j,v ZS 
(vt,j A markhM) = Q) , j)t’,,,o s (pr,j A @,). 
On a true state change (is), when a transaction ft’ has been applicable, at least 
one precondition must have held in the prestate: 
(Note that O, nj do not depend on X.) Induction confirms that marking(X) is 
defined. Thus such state transitions satisfy 
(**e) QX /\ (marking(X) = v + mm 
UC v
f a state (w.r.t. OBJI) is only repeated (Z’), its function marking remains unchanged. 
n fact markings within an iteration-invariant aph (Definition 4.14) do not change 
on a state iterat so that (**) holds for su a transition, too. For the sequence 
tp as a whole, w y Lemma 5.4, i.e., its 0 
and thus g itsel 
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this result it would 
)= v) 1’(P) (@JlVG v) 
ere these additions have already been co 
the pre/posteonditions in or&r to prepare subsequent simphfrcations. 
ed wit 
As a conseque spe~i~~at~ons (t ether with the in str~i~t) 
and the new spe ithout the eonst 
to the associated of 5i:i!e state sequences. 
ordla twe is Q bijecfion between (g- ( w.r. t. 
and o,l=VX @,) and (g (w.r.t. OBJ)~ g- accepted by Ty. and executable NV. F. 3-l. 
roof. A state sequence a in the first class is accepted because of 5.6, 
it obviously is executable with respect o 3 also, since no new state transition was 
traduced by refine ent. These properties carry over to the 0B.Lreduct. Vice versa, 
the condition of Lemma 5.4 uniquely (!) determines a state sequence Q=+ for each 
a in the second class, so that we get an inverse mapping, too. 
The following new pre/postconditions result from the above 
p for the body of constraint Cl (Example 2.9), its transition graph 
Tr (Example 4.16, repeated in Fig. 6), and the transaction register (Example 3.4): 
register: 
case re [true A ] marking, = (2, y) 
A (P22 v P,,) /J (P22 =+ marking, = (2, Y)) 
A (p23 3 marking&‘) -3) 
istered(c) A. . . 
this-years y + 1 A registered * ovvner(C’) = manuf(C’)) 
A (Iregistered --3 marking,(c’)=(2, y)) 
A (registered 1 marking, = 3) 
re marking, (c’) = 3 
ost registered(c) A. . . A registered A marking, =3 
Fig. 6. 
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The initial node (1) is not considered here, since it cannot be reached by state 
transitions. Note that the variable c of th enamed into c’, so 
at the additions 
t/i). Since the corresp 
function markin 
is simply changed into (rr}t{ p n +}. 
Although we have 
mation results often re 
(Additional postconditions usual 
tests.) 'I~&'oE, postcohditions subconditions” that 
are affected by the respective ns may be original 
subformulae or specializations to certain substitutions, i.e. combinations of objects 
and data. 
Apart from standard sim lifications due to equivalence laws of predicate logic, 
of the underlying data types, and of transitional logic, invariants of transactio 
(Definition 3.5) can b ilized. Obviously, they may b eleted from a postcundition, 
if they can be conch ed from the precondition. onitoring static constraints 
additionally exploits the inductive assertion that the constraint has been valid in 
or dynamic constraints, the corresponding transition graphs offer a 
appropriate analogy: Each state of an accepted sequence must satisfy one ingoing 
e node marked for that state. Thus the following graph invariant 6 
may inductively be assumed for prestates, considering the respective marking. 
. For the transition graph TV as above, let 
uemes ( w.r. t. 0 
X A masking( 
LIE v 
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e ( Step III l Sirnplijicc t ion ) . 
(j, u): (vj A masking(X) = V) t’ { p>,J 
(jE{l,...,c}, vE ) of a transaction specification t’E Y, those st:>formulae 6 of 
the postcondition may be replaced by which are implied by 
which are invariant under t (note: A,. = A,). 
tegrity constraints will often be “independent” fr 
itively, our example constraint (Cl ) on timely registration is not affected by the 
transaction se register cannot raise any conflict for any object di 
ere the graph invariant itself is invariant under the 
des or some substitutions; then the marking in an iteration- 
invariant graph does not change. 
3. If v is a node in an iteration-invariant transition graph Tq and Q is 
constant substitution of variables X (in q), the following holds: 
(a) $, invariant under t’ + marking(X) = v invariant under t’, 
(b) (X # 8 3 6,) invxiant under t’a (X f @*marking(X) = v) invariant 
under 1’. 
f. Let 0 be any substitution such that $. is invariant under t’ for 8. If the node 
v has been marked before execution of F’, St, holds in the poststate O-, and so does 
the label q(c) of some ingoing edge e. Due to iteration-invariance (Definition 4.14) 
there is a loop e’ at node v such that q(e) 3 v(e’) and thus [q @]I= T(e’). So the 
marking remains unchanged for 8. Cl 
The corresponding refinements of postcanditions may completely be omitted in 
these cases, but the frame must be extended according to the lemma. 
(Step III, cont.). (a) If 6,, is invariant under t for some 
ns of postconditions as introduced in Transformation 5.4 
(refinement) may be dropped in all cases (j, v) for the node v, pro*:ided that the 
frame is extend by the formula (marking(X) = v). 
# _8 =+ 6,) is invariant for some constant substitution 8 (e. 
the transaction parameters), the variables of those a 
by the ts or data of 8, provide that the frame i 
rnarkin v). 
e argument as a 
- 
en transforming the gra 
riants registered(d) and 
into the transaction 5 
istesedfc”) may be use 
guarantee that 
n case can equival 
case may be 0mEtt if an nly if (72-h =--lp, is e 
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xam Transforming the other constraint (C2) into the specification of sell 
(T2) shows another basic (but perhaps rare) simplification. Here, even an equivalence 
x /&I marking2(X) = v a 6, 
VE v 
holds in accepted sequences so that arkings can equivalently be expressed by 
means of given object functions and predicates. e graph invariant of Tz ( 
is 
G1 = owner(c)=manuf(c), 62=owner(c)=cor&-GARAGE(co 
ERSBN(owner(c)) v (is-GARAGE(co) A owner(c) # co). 
Thus no signature extension (step I) is needed. At the end, steps II -IV have changed 
the applicability condition only by listing the legal transitions of ownerships: 
co f newco A (owner( 6) # manuf( c) * -7is- NUF( newco)) 
co (ovvner(c)=co n is-GARAGE(co) + is-PERSON(ne 
6. Conclusions 
In this article we have presented concepts and rules for transforming dynamic 
integrity constraints into transaction specifications. Finally, transactions guarantee 
integrity in the sense that every executable finite state sequence is partially admissible 
with respect to the constraints. Transformation consists of two main parts: 
(A) construction of transition graphs from temporal formulae, 
(B) incorporation of graph processing into prelpostco 
Since transactions simulate computation 0 f node markings, executable sequences 
are accepted by the graphs; acceptance in turn implies at least provisional admissibil- 
iry (i.e. correctness of present database behaviour) and at most potential admissibility 
(i.e. correctness of present and possible future behaviour). 
of this transformation can be automated by using graph construc- 
resented elsewhere) and the refinement rule for pre/postconditions 
. Further manipulations like graph reduction and, above al 
ifications of transaction specifications need su ort by automated theorem 
techniques for the respective logics. For exa , the resolution method 
simplifying static constraints in relational updates might be a candidate for adapta- 
tion to our setting of dynamic constraints and arbitrary transactions. Our sim- 
cation rules show how invariants of transactions and of trannsitiori gra 
be utilized therein. 
In any case, interactions with the database designer will be needed to 
trol readability of results. Since 
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Thus, the theory presented lays the foundation of a 
only delivers a correct specification of database behaviour, but also prepares 
ient implicit mo itoring of dynamic integrity. 
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